Thursday, February 07, 2013 

"Oh no, not if I have anything to do with it, and I do have something to do with it! Lol."

Reading the IM transcripts between the bankers who conspired to fix the Libor inter-bank rate at RBS, it's difficult to know whether to feel sorry for these children trapped in the bodies of men, or be rather scared that these are the people who can either make or break the economy. You can read far too much into the way people type, it's true, but there's something not quite right about these supposed Masters of the Universe begging each other to commit fraud in text speak.  The messages are of such a piece that when one of the traders writes in something approaching 20th century English it comes as a shock. Was he not feeling quite right that day, or did he consider himself normally somewhat above the juvenile styling of his peers?

Chief executive Stephen Hester for his part blamed precisely this "mateyness" and bar culture among the "junior" traders for the entire episode, rather than say, greed or the fact that there was no supervision whatsoever over the setting of Libor until mid way through 2011. Not that this necessarily would have ensured it either wouldn't have happened or been spotted sooner: as the logs also show, wash trades were used to reward brokers and they sometimes went wrong, yet still the bank failed to notice.  It reminds somewhat of Nick Leeson at Barings, able to keep getting away with taking ever greater risks and making ever larger losses, until he finally brought down the entire bank.

In keeping with the day's other main story, those at the top of RBS won't be losing their jobs.  Indeed, the only person other than the traders themselves to leave will be John Hourican, the now former head of investment at the bank.  According to RBS he had "no involvement in or knowledge of the misconduct", something that could also be said of many at the bank who will be remaining in their posts.  Still, we shouldn't feel too sorry for him: he might not be getting the up to £4m he was entitled to, but he will still receive 12 months' salary, a mere £700,000.  As for the fines levied on the bank, "most" of the £390m imposed by both the FSA and the Americans will be clawed back from bonuses previously paid out, so rather than the taxpayer fining the taxpayer, it's slightly more complicated, although obviously it's still a mostly circular process.

As noted on the Graun live blog, it was rather odd though that the only person named was Hourican, who did the decent thing.  The men who actually rigged the rate remain anonymous, presumably on the grounds that there may be criminal charges brought against them.  Considering that so far no one has been prosecuted for their role in the crash at all, this seems a rather forlorn hope, although you never know.  All we have to identify those responsible is that they like sushi, steak, a free lunch, and one remarked he was up and down like a "whores drawers" (sic).  Well, at least it narrows it down slightly.  How many bankers can there be who have a taste for those things?

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Thursday, July 05, 2012 

The fix is in.

Well, we certainly learned a lot from today's parliamentary debate. Ed Balls, for one, has mad staring eyes when riled, whereas George Osborne has an upper lip that curls when he knows he's been caught out in a lie. Quite why Osborne thought that he could accuse Balls of being involved in trying to get the Libor rate lower when as it now seems he had no evidence whatsoever and get away with it is unclear, unless the omnishambles has unfathomably failed to put a dent in his hubris. It wasn't a case of the Labour party never being so rattled, as Osborne claimed, as it was Balls and others being outraged by false accusations, and as so often in politics, it's not the real examples of suffering that MPs could do something about that really motivate them, but rather personal so-called smears, even those that never happened.

The other fix then is in. Partially down to how Cameron had his fingers burned when he was bounced by Ed Miliband into setting up the Leveson inquiry, and partially down to his adherence to George's wheeze to blame everything on Labour, we have a parliamentary rather than an independent inquiry. Sure, they'll apparently take evidence under oath and will be "briefed" by QCs, but anyone who claims this isn't a poor substitute for a judge-led inquiry is lying to themselves. As Labour managed to dredge up, back when the boot was on the other foot the Tories were of course calling for an independent inquiry into banking as a whole, one they didn't get at the time. Now with the opportunity to launch one, they've ducked it.

All the stranger is that while Cameron was always likely to regret Leveson, having continued to employ Andy Coulson for reasons known only to himself, they are on the whole pretty clean on banking. Yes, they've been funded by the City, but then they always have been, and yes, they warned about excessive regulation when Ed Balls was in charge of making sure it was "light touch", but they can hardly be linked to the Libor fixing or the disasters that led to the bail outs. At worst they can share some of the blame for delaying the full nationalisation of Northern Rock, having disingenuously claimed it would take us back to the 70s, something that rattled Brown and Darling to the point of doing everything other than obvious, but that's a fairly minor point in the debacle. If Cameron and Osborne really believe that Shriti Vadera or whoever else was involved in telling the banks to set Libor lower so that they looked more secure than they were, then who's more likely to get to the truth, a judge and a QC or a cross-party group of MPs and Lords?

Osborne's gamble was that by linking Libor to Balls and friends it would therefore damage Labour's standing in the polls for economic credibility. If anything, it seems likely to have the opposite effect. All today's clusterfuck will have done is convince people that politicians, as ever, will fight amongst themselves and duck the big decisions when it has the potential to damage them personally. They'll have noticed this is just another exercise in blaming the last government for the mess everything's in, something they'll only put up with for so long, and about two years into a parliament as we now are is the limit. We already knew that Osborne is a tool whose powers of political strategy, if they were ever as impressive as claimed, have currently deserted him. More surprising is that Cameron was just as daft in going along with it.

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Wednesday, July 04, 2012 

"Explosive revelations." Yeah, right.

It's not always a giggle, sitting down and reading the front page of the Graun on the evening after it went to bed. It most certainly won't be for Jill Treanor, Patrick Wintour and Heather Stewart, all of whom contributed to the report headlined "Diamond cuts up rough", presumably having been informed of the evidence Bob Diamond was going to give to the Treasury committee today:

The high-profile and outspoken banker is expected to unleash a wave of explosive revelations about the role of City watchdogs and senior Whitehall figures in the manipulation of crucial interest rates that landed the bank with a record £290m fine last week.

Just as it was expected (including by yours truly) that Rupert Murdoch would follow up his son's sensational dropping in it of Jeremy Hunt at the Leveson inquiry with more of the same only for him to do nothing of the sort, so we too waited in vain for Diamond to start dishing the dirt. The supposed "smoking gun" this time, the memo released by Barclays yesterday, which apparently showed that both the Bank of England and "Whitehall officials" had implied that Barclays was setting its own Libor rate too high, was almost dismissed by Diamond. It was important enough for him to make a note of the phone call he had with Paul Tucker, the deputy governor of the BoE, and then email it to the then chief executive and Jerry del Messier, who subsequently did interpret it as permission to fix the Libor rate lower, but Diamond instead took it as a warning that "Whitehall officials" were interpreting the high rate as meaning Barclays was in need of a bailout regardless of what the bank was saying. Tucker for his part has requested to appear before the committee next week and give his side of the story, which you have to suspect is now likely to back up Diamond's account.

Much of the rest of the session also resembled Murdoch senior's appearance before Leveson. Just as Keith couldn't be expected to take responsibility for the tens of thousands of workers under him, Diamond felt it was incredibly unfair that Barclays as a whole was being damaged due to the actions of just 14 traders. The concerns about the fixing of the rate had gone up to the "desk supervisor" levels, but no further. It didn't matter that Libor requests were often shouted across the trading floor, which normally would be a bit of a give away, as management figures were apparently in need of having their ears syringed. Diamond knew or had at least heard that all the other banks were attempting to fix their rates, and yet he didn't know of anything similar at the bank he loved until a month ago when he saw the Financial Services Authority's report. As for his potential severance package, which could be worth up to £22m, that was a matter for the board and the board only. There's as much chance as Diamond donating it to Shelter as John Mann suggested as there is Prince Charles reimbursing the taxpayer for the ridiculous 20 grand he spent chartering a jet from Aberdeen to London.

Quite why it is that the government is still insisting any inquiry into the Libor rate fixing has to be parliamentary and not independent is unclear. If they really want to nail Ed Balls to the wall, as George Osborne so clearly does, then why run the risk of Labour refusing to back an inquiry at all when an judge-led one would presumably reach the same result? There are plenty of good reasons for not holding an independent inquiry: few of them are ever worthy of the name (Leveson being a notable exception), they cost a bomb, and generally, they take longer to report than was first anticipated. Mostly they fail though because their focus is purely on employees or servants of the state, and the state has never been much cop at holding itself to account. Any wider inquiry into the banks would be the opposite of this. Moreover, today's evidence from the select committee showcased the flaws of parliamentary inquiries: every MP involved wants to ask at least one question, and not all are as forensic, composed or pointed in their phrasing and flow as a well prepared barrister can be, nor is Andrew Tyrie the equal of an authoritative, slightly world weary judge.

While it's impossible to dismiss the notion that Labour favours an independent inquiry as it will kick the whole subject slightly further down the road, not wanting to revisit their failure to regulate the banks properly, it's equally clear that both Cameron and Osborne seem determined to keep it in House for pure party political advantage. Osborne, the supposed great strategist and political brain who nonetheless delivered the omnishambolic budget, seems desperate to get the spotlight away from him and onto his opposite number. It doesn't matter that getting to the bottom of what really went wrong at the banks is ever so slightly more important than making Balls a temporary fall guy, this it seems is what the Conservatives are currently reduced to.

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Thursday, June 28, 2012 

From scandal to scandal.

The parallels between News International and Barclays are obvious. Both were/are arrogant, strutting companies, ran by arrogant, strutting individuals who believed that they were above the law. Both believed that they could either deride or injunct their critics, protected as they were by their connections with the most powerful in society. Both believed that they could obfuscate their way through a period of trouble, whether it was countless NI execs and editors claiming their problems were all the fault of one rogue reporter, or Bob Diamond saying first that the time for apologies was over, before thinking better of it and declaring how he was determined to make Barclays a "good citizen" (and therefore failing the simple test that if you think corporations should have the same rights as people then you deserve to be slapped with a fish), at the same time as it was continuing to attempt to avoid paying tax.

If it hadn't been for the Guardian, it's unlikely that News Corporation would have today announced the splitting of the publishing side of the business from that of broadcasting, with Keith himself stepping down as CEO of the new company. If he is indeed now going to concentrate on the US, then good riddance doesn't really quite cover it; the man most responsible for the coarsening of culture in this country, for the rise of the celebrity non-entity and unending, underhand attacks on those who opposed his politics has finally received his long overdue comeuppance.

It can only be hoped the same happens to those responsible at Barclays. The chief executive at the time of the fixing of the Libor rates, John Varley, was incredibly being spoken of as the next governor of the Bank of England. Bob Diamond, the current CEO, was the head of Barclays Capital when those underneath him were swapping emails talking of opening bottles of Bollinger in return for favours in manipulating the rates. Barclays, it should be remembered, only avoided being directly bailed out by the taxpayer due to it raising funds from the Qataris, although it still depended on guarantees from the British state at the same time.

The fine from the Financial Services Authority of £59.5m, despite being the largest ever imposed by a regulator pales when compared with the £170m levied in the US. The irony of the home of capitalism red in tooth and claw being far tougher on corporate crime than this supposed more social democratic nation is no longer amusing, just outrageous. George Osborne can blame Labour all he likes, but he was the one complaining back in 2006 that regulation was increasing and threatened London remaining the financial capital of the world. The case for the splitting up of the retail and investment parts of the banks is now unanswerable, and if Osborne wants to remembered for something other than creating a double dip recession, bringing the City to heal would be it.

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Thursday, March 19, 2009 

A depressing pyrrhic victory.

The only possible way you can describe Barclays' depressing legal victory over the Guardian, Mr Justice Blake ruling that the paper cannot republish the memos detailing the workings of Barclays' Structured Capital Markets team is as a pyrrhic one. The Guardian, in its own editorial, more than sums it up when it states that all that Barclays has achieved is to shut the stable door after the horse has not just bolted, but completely disappeared from view. This is thanks to the documents being immediately mirrored by Wikileaks, where they still reside and where they can be downloaded from a server in this country, in defiance of the injunction. The terms of the injunction mean that the Guardian cannot even point people in the direction of where they can find them or "incite" others to publish; all they will have to do instead is Google for them, where they'll quickly find them.

Part of Justice Blake's justification for ruling against the Guardian was that he didn't believe that the documents had spread far enough for their confidentiality to have completely broken down. This is clearly nonsense: all those that Barclays wanted to hide these documents from have not only got them, they've been poring over them now since Tuesday, whether they be HMRC, Barclays' rivals, or anyone else with the slightest grudge against the bank. The Grauniad refers to the House of Lords ruling on Spycatcher, that you cannot put the melting ice cube back into the freezer. That is more than apt: through the ban the only people who are being denied from being allowed to see what everyone else has is those who are either without the internet or those that have never heard of Wikileaks and can't properly use a search engine.

Equally weak was Blake's second argument. He agreed that the Guardian can report on the contents of the documents, as that is in the public interest; not in the public interest is the unexpurgated publication of the documents in full, containing legally sensitive matters and other confidential information. There are some obvious flaws in this: how is the paper meant to know firstly what is considered legally sensitive and confidential and what isn't? Their lawyers' might come to predictability different conclusions from those of Barclays'. This appears to have the potential to be a slippery slope; how else can a paper know what is sensitive unless they first consult the people they are preparing to expose and give them the opportunity to halt publication in its entirety? Ideally, journalists should do this anyway, but there are certain situations where if they did on an incredibly important story, undoubtedly in the public interest, they could end up not being able to publish anyway. In cases such of that as Max Mosley, there ought to be no question of the person being informed beforehand; when it involves politicians being accused of corruption or corporations being accused of blatant and artifical tax avoidance, there is a good argument for not doing so. Furthermore, why shouldn't the general public be able to view the source material for such exposes and be able to make their own minds up where it is possible for the hacks to provide such a service? Journalists cannot always be relied upon to report accurately what is in things which they either come across, investigate or are handed to them, especially when it comes to such incredibly complex and difficult to understand matters as tax avoidance. The Guardian itself is has an example of this, having misinterpreted how Tesco was operating a tax avoidance scheme and wrongly claiming that they were avoiding corporation tax to the tune of £1bn when they were in fact avoiding stamp duty land tax on a much lesser scale.

Blake also suggested that "if the debate can flourish without the publication of the full documents, that is a highly material factor". But none of the articles in either the Graun or the Sunday Times begins to cover in anything approaching forensic detail just what is discussed and proposed in these documents; they just give a broad summary. Debate can flourish without them being freely available, but that is not truly informed debate. The best summation of what they contain was made by Alan Rusbridger in his statement to the court:

"I considered these documents to be of the highest significance in the debate about tax avoidance.

"They revealed at first hand the processes involved in structuring extremely complex and artificial tax avoidance vehicles; how lawyers and accountants worked together to exploit loopholes in government legislation; and the degree to which they are sanctioned at the highest levels within Barclays."


Only by examining the documents first hand do you fully understand just how Barclays' SCM team operated and operates. Blake's decision has slammed the door on one source of light, but the others remain wide open.

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Tuesday, March 17, 2009 

The smartest guys in the room get hot under the collar.

It would be nice to think that with various tax havens having to promise to be rather more transparent in their operations than they have been previously, threatened with being "named and shamed" by the OECD, that the actual businesses which exploit such havens would be following a similar trajectory. The sad reality is that both will continue to get away with it just as they have in the past: they'll wait for the current mood to slowly wither away, as it will when the economy eventually recovers, and then the same old lawyers and same bean-counters will be back to doing what they do best, letting the rich and powerful get away it while castigating the scum at the bottom who dare to fiddle their benefits.

Barclays however hasn't even bothered with letting it all blow other. Despite being in negotiations with the Treasury, threatened by its toxic assets, which it wants the government to insure, it still succeeded in gaining an injunction against the Guardian, stopping it from hosting documents detailing "Project Knight", a tax avoidance scheme devised in Feburary 2007 which could have seen the bank save between £40m to £60m in a single year. This is despite the fact the scheme is not illegal, and that Barclays even says that it fully informed Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs of what it was doing. Why then is it so desperate for the documents not to enter the public domain? Is it ashamed of what it was doing, legal though it was? Barclays' lawyers Freshfields argued that the documents were property of the bank, and that could only have been acquired by someone who had breached confidentiality agreements.

Sadly for Barclays, either the documents were up long enough for someone to mirror them, or they were also distributed to Wikileaks, increasingly becoming vital against legal threats of all varieties, where they are still fully available. Not just is the proposal for Project Knight included, but also documents detailing the setting up of a "Brazilian Investment Strategy", "Project Brontos", "Project Berry II - Investment in Index Linked Gilts", "Project Faber", "Project Valiha" and a memo detailing the minutes of a meeting of Barclays' Structured Capital Markets team concerning the setting up of an office for SCM in Luxembourg. Most interesting to do with the injunction issued against the Guardian is the involvement of Freshfields with Project Faber. Normally you would imagine that Barclays would have employed a separate legal firm to deal with the media, as Freshfields is ostensibly only involved with business law advice, but in this instance they seem to have decided not to do so. This raises a potential conflict of interest because the document on Project Faber details Freshfields' legal advice on the tax risk which the project would incur, and unlike the other documents where the risks are summarised fairly succinctly, Freshfields goes into quite some detail on five specific UK risks which Faber raises. Again, there's no suggestion here that either Barclays or Freshfields has done anything specifically illegal, but it also certainly seems to be in Freshfields' interest, as well as Barclays', to stop the documents from entering the public domain.

I won't pretend that I understand much of these documents, nor probably would 99% of the other people in the country, unless we had the likes of "Slicker" from Private Eye personally explaining them to us, but Richard Murphy is another man who does and who was asked by the Sunday Times to look at them after they were first passed them but didn't publish them in full. He described Project Valiha thusly:

It is designed so the money goes round in a big circle and comes back to Barclays so that they make £99m in tax savings without taking any risk at all. The whole thing takes three days.


As for the others:

“They work on the basis of exploiting tax regulations and the laws of different countries. They don’t generate any real profit for anyone, but they do save vast amounts of tax that they would otherwise pay.”

The Sunday Times claimed that Barclays might have been saving up to £1bn in tax through the various schemes, something the bank has vigorously denied. Murphy has though commented rather further on the schemes, of which it seems there might be even more which haven't turned up on Wikileaks:

I’ll tell you what I think is going on with Barclays. In my opinion it has constructed a series of wholly almost entirely artificial transactions undertaken through a significant number of separate legal entities, most under the control of Barclays itself, but some, inevitably, owned, or controlled (and in these deals it is always difficult to define what that might mean, deliberately) by the counterparty to the transaction - in most cases banks such as Goldman Sachs, Deutsche Bank, Credit Suisse, Fortis and so on.

Those entities have been in a number of jurisdictions, the UK and the Cayman Islands being the most common, but Luxembourg also being a participant. Some have been limited companies, some limited liability partnerships.

Some of those entities, even when incorporated elsewhere are tax resident in the UK, and some are not.

Some account under International Financial Reporting Standards. Some account under UK accounting standards.

It would seem that Barclays are trying to realise profits that they have ‘manufactured’ in most cases through these immensely complex structures by arbitraging (trading off) international taxation law, company law in various jurisdictions and even accounting standards, to achieve taxation results that mean that profits are realised or sold without taxation liabilities arising for Barclays.

The result has been a deliberate attempt to defraud – by which term I mean seeking to secure a financial advantage by deception, although not (I stress) illegally.

The deception has been on three parties. The first has been tax authorities who despite their brave statements to the contrary did not, I suspect, know the full details of some of these arrangements. It would seem that some may not have been disclosed to them.

Secondly, Barclays have sought to defraud (using the above definition) the taxpayers of the UK and maybe elsewhere who have not received the funds rightfully due to them on profits declared.

Thirdly, I think they have defrauded (using the above definition) their shareholders by declaring profits which were not, in my opinion, sustainable and which were manufactured through preconceived and structured financing deals in which the counterparties played a remarkably small part in exchange for what was, in effect, a fee to allow Barclays to record realised profits by turning the manufactured profits into third-party transactions.


This seems to be the real reason why Barclays is so desperate to keep the documents out of ordinary people's hands. They realise that they are some of the first real hard evidence to emerge of just how specialist teams within the banks sought to avoid tax, and who were subsequently incredibly richly rewarded for their work, with Murphy claiming that the head of Barclays' SCM division may well have been earning an astonishing £40m a year (other sources claim it could be £75m, for which see this revoltingly sycophantic article), about the same amount as that which one of the schemes would have saved the bank. In order to offset such huge remuneration, the profits from the avoidance would have had to have been far higher, and the £1bn a year figure no longer looks as nonsensical as Barclays claim. It somewhat puts Fred Goodwin's pension, even the £3 million lump-sum we now know he received into perspective, hence why Murphy has put up a further four posts on what should be done. At the very least we need to stop apologising for and excusing tax avoidance and demand that companies, in the words of Alistair Darling, don't just adhere to the letter of the law but also the spirit of it. Great public anger over the bailing out of the banks has not yet reached boiling point, but the Barclays revelations may just push the mercury further towards the top.

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