Monday, May 02, 2011 

The American way of death.

(Yep, this is long.)

When they finally came for him, you'd imagine it was exactly as Osama himself would have expected and feared. Two helicopter gunships suddenly swooping in, one of which swiftly crashed, continuing the image of marines as being capable of both great moments of farce and swift acts of terrifying retribution, delivering between 20 and 25 Navy Seals into what proved to a short battle. Without confirmation of how many were in the compound and whether bin Laden had much more defence than a few bodyguards and members of his own family, forty minutes seems about right for what was an operation which would have planned for little overall resistance. Most of that time was probably spent breaching the buildings themselves; if otherwise, those defending bin Laden must have held their own for at least a few minutes against overwhelming odds.

As the news came through last night that Obama was to make an unexpected announcement so late in the evening, my initial thought was it would be to tell the world that the other current thorn in the side of the West, Colonel Gaddafi, had been killed. Certainly, that bin Laden's life was ended in such close proximity to the missile strike in Tripoli that that killed Gaddafi's second-youngest son and some of his grandchildren is no mere coincidence. Instead, it's the ultimate expression of American geopolitical power, something that even Israel with its permissive attitude towards the assassination of those that threaten her can't match: the willingness to kill foreign leaders or terrorists without even the merest nod to international law, or extended justification as to why other means could not have been taken first.

For it's clear that just as the mission on bin Laden's compound in Abbottabad was to kill rather than even attempt to capture, so was the strike in Libya designed to cut off the head of the Gaddafi regime. What the US decides to do about bin Laden on their own is up to them and their consciences, and for the rest of us to muse about; killing children, even those with the misfortune to be born into the Gaddafi clan under the dubious terms of a UN resolution which calls for a ceasefire is something quite different. It's worth noting that this came after a new call for just that had come from the Libyan government, immediately rejected by the rebels and the NATO alliance without so much as a glance at the details. For now, small reversals in fortune have once again emboldened the opposition, while that members of Gaddafi's clan have been killed suggests there may well be an intelligence leak from within his inner circle. Stalemate nonetheless still looks the most likely outcome.

Passing judgement both on the operation to kill bin Laden and on the notable, if small-scale celebrations which followed last night in Washington and New York is doubly difficult when sitting across the ocean from where the 9/11 attacks took place. This country may well have faced down the IRA and dealt with the 7/7 bombings, yet we can't properly understand just what feelings the events of that day stirred up and which are still playing out now. As such, as distasteful as it seemed for someone's death to be celebrated in such a way as it was outside the White House, even someone with as much blood on their hands as bin Laden, you can't really condemn it and are instead left to tolerate such a reaction.

Indeed, if there's anyone to blame for the manner in which bin Laden was to be "brought to justice", which we'll come to, then it's the Bush administration. While Obama became president promising to kill the al-Qaida leader, he was pushed into such a position by his predecessors and their policy on "enemy combatants". With Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the most senior al-Qaida operative in US custody unlikely to face any sort of trial in the near future, trying to take bin Laden alive should it even have been achievable would have left the US with an unsolvable conundrum as to what to do with him. It seems almost certain that he too would have been left to rot in Guantanamo, indefinitely held with little prospect of judicial proceedings. Virtually no one in the States has criticised Obama for killing rather than attempting to seize bin Laden, with those on the right predictably congratulating the president for "pulling the trigger" rather than bringing him back alive.

Obama, it should be said, has mainly struck exactly the right tone. Getting the balance right between triumphalism, which it would have so easy to slip into, without underplaying just how significant bin Laden's death would be to those with relatives who lost their lives on 9/11 and so many others affected by the wars that followed was going to be difficult. If anything, he managed it better today than last night. While no one can claim with a straight face that this isn't a victory, even if a very belated one, there was still something troubling about how the violent death of one man was presented by Obama as a "testament to the greatness of our country" and how it was a reminder that "America can do whatever we set our mind to". From the outside, it looks like the opposite: that the greatest and most powerful superpower to have ever bestrode the planet took almost ten years to find one man and then blow his brains out looks like weakness, of a hollowness at its very centre.

Similarly, quite how the killing of bin Laden is synonymous with bringing him to justice, as opposed to being an act of vengeance, something which politicians on both sides of the US divide have said has happened, is difficult to see. Even taking into account the difficulties there would have been with trying him had he been captured alive, his death and quick disposal at sea is the sort of operation which leaves behind a bitter taste. Justice following both wars and crimes against humanity has been variable, it must be said, yet it will always be preferable to the bullet to the head. More than this, bin Laden simply didn't deserve to go down in what will be so easily be presented by jihadists as heroic circumstances. Along with Ayman al-Zawahiri, al-Qaida's spiritual leader, bin Laden barely took part in any actual fighting, save for a disastrous battle after the Russians had already left Afghanistan. It was the hundreds, if not thousands of others who were inspired by him who were willing to take part in the "martyrdom operations" that made his brand of takfirist jihadism so virulent and feared. Like with KSM, he wanted to die a shaheed without being prepared to practice what he preached, and he's been given his wish.

This was all part of the bin Laden myth, relentlessly stoked and mined by al-Qaida's exceptional propaganda. His image was honed until he was the equivalent of an Islamist Che Guevara, and those dedicated to the jihadist cause looked to bin Laden not just for guidance but saw him and his messages as being close to unquestionable. This was all the more remarkable for the fact that he had no religious training whatsoever, yet he issued fatwas and took on the title of sheikh regardless. His relative absence which has increased over the last few years dulled nothing of the respect in which he was held, and repeatedly underlined just how much of a second in command al-Zawahiri was, even as he answered questions posed to him on the jihadist forums in official releases from as-Sahab. The only real rival he had was the even more brutal Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the leader of al-Qaida in Iraq, whom was given the "franchise" in the country despite the differences over tactics between the groups.

All the same, and as others have pointed out, al-Qaida's influence has been waning ever since the Islamic State of Iraq's back was broken by the awakening groups in the country, and there have been no major attacks in the West linked to the original base, as opposed to the "franchises" set up in its image for a number of years. This isn't to diminish bin Laden's ultimate success: he knew there was never any possibility that his tiny group on its own could defeat America. His plan was instead to draw a response from the West through attacks like 9/11, which he believed would ultimately result in Muslims across the Middle East rising up against their rulers through their complicity with attacks on the Ummah. He got his first wish, as the continuing war in Afghanistan demonstrates; what didn't happen is any great rallying to the jihadist cause. Rather than fighting for the caliphate, the battles being waged by the Taliban and other Islamic groups are nationalist rather than internationalist. Moreover, the nascent Arab spring and the revolution in Egypt especially have shown as never before that rather than wanting the medieval, fundamentalist vision of society which al-Qaida wishes to impose, the vast majority favour democracy, even if it eventually takes on a distinct Islamist-influenced flavour.

Osama bin Laden's death is then a major setback for al-Qaida, if not for jihadism itself. His ultimate legacy could well be the inspiring of a second generation of even more brutal ideologues, ready to carry on the mantle of spectacular attacks against soft targets. For now, his closest successor is likely to be Anwar al-Awlaki, the spiritual leader of al-Qaida in Yemen, already linked to multiple attacks. The first phase in what will almost certainly be a long conflict against the ideology of takfirist jihadism may now be over, but there are many others already fighting just waiting for the opportunity to carry on what al-Qaida and bin Laden began.

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Monday, December 20, 2010 

Time for al-Qaida to move into cloud seeding.

It almost wouldn't be Christmas in the 21st century if there wasn't the spectre of exploding brown people lurking in the background. This war on Christmas, much like the fictional separate one waged by secularists and politically correct loons in council offices up and down the country has in the past mostly been fought by politicians rather than actual combatants: back in 2006 John Reid (remember him?) warned that an attack over the holiday was highly likely, while a year later Jacqui Smith (remember her?) went one better and claimed that there could be a "dirty bomb" strike against the nation. Somehow the country went on with its business and the jihadists failed to stop jolly old St. Nick from descending down chimneys worldwide.

Following Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab starting a party in his pants to which no one else was invited on Christmas Day last year, not to mention the cargo bomb plot and the failed attack in Stockholm earlier in the month, we have to take things much more seriously. Hence presumably today's raids in Cardiff, Stoke, Birmingham and London, which John Yates (remember him?) has described as "absolutely necessary". In a way, this is an improvement over the pronouncements made in the past by police chiefs, who alongside politicians have done their best before anything has so much has been found to impress upon everyone how if they hadn't acted hundreds if not thousands of people would have shortly found their limbs separated from their bodies.

It does however also hardly inspire confidence that the police and security services are completely certain of the information they're acting upon. If you need to say disrupting an apparent plot is "absolutely necessary", it's almost as if they're expecting the coming criticism after those arrested are released without charge. Almost forgotten are the raids in Manchester in April of last year, when no less than Gordon Brown informed the nation that a "very big plot" had been foiled, only for no charges against those arrested to be forthcoming. The Americans have since come to our rescue somewhat, requesting the extradition of Abid Naseer, who earlier in the year had won his appeal against being deported to Pakistan. It says something about the differences between our two nations that while we failed to even attempt to make any charges against him stick, the US seeks him over "conspiracy to use a destructive device", on the same grounds presumably as the Times Square bomber is facing jail time over "attempting to use a weapon of mass destruction".

Whether lessons have been learned from past investigations that have ended up looking ignominious is dubious to say the least. Already those same old "security sources" are out briefing, with even the normally staid Guardian suggesting that Whitehall and "shoppers and/or revellers" in the West Midlands were the targets, potentially reprising their past glories in talking absolute nonsense to all too credulous hacks.

My cynicism is hopefully misplaced, and a serious, dangerous threat to the public could well have been stopped in its tracks. It's difficult though to come to any other conclusion that rather than continuing to depend on explosives, al-Qaida should look into acquiring some silver iodide rockets as used by China; all you need is about six inches of snow to bring the country to a grinding halt. Merry Christmas.

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Monday, December 13, 2010 

Those deadly gas canisters strike again.

Taimour Abdulwahab al-Abdaly's failed attack in Stockholm, as many have already noted, was remarkably similar in execution to the assault launched by our old friends Bilal Abdullah and Kafeel Ahmed (aka Abu Beavis and Abu Butthead) against the Tiger Tiger nightclub and Glasgow airport back in 2007 and not just because al-Abdaly was the only one to die.

As with their attack, al-Abdaly seems to have either been trained to use gas canisters as part of his makeshift bomb or decided upon using them as obtaining explosives in the necessary quantities for a truly spectacular detonation was just too difficult. The really key connection, as yet unconfirmed and still somewhat disputed in the case of Abdullah, is that both seem to have at least some connection with the self-proclaimed Islamic State of Iraq, the jihadist umbrella group mainly made up of the remnants of what was once al-Qaida in Iraq. The ISI claimed midway through Abdullah's trial that he had been a member and was trained by the group, only for the attack to go wrong due to his incompetence. While they haven't yet claimed responsibility for al-Abdaly's strike, the ISI have released a statement praising him and expressing approval.

Quite why, if al-Abdaly does turn out to have even tenuous connections with the ISI, they seem so set on encouraging the use of gas canisters is difficult to ascertain. While they might make up a part of the bombs used in Iraq, the notion that you can just heat up or pierce gas canisters and the end result will be a deadly explosion is a silly one,
as this article from the Register made clear back in 2007. You might, as the footage from Sweden showed, get a somewhat impressive looking fire going and create a fireball which could conceivably hurt or even kill people if you're lucky, or you might, as in London and New York (Faisal Shahzad, hilariously, is charged with attempted use of a "weapon of mass destruction") spark absolutely nothing at all. Either our Islamic extremist friends are getting something very wrong indeed once they're back in the West, or they're being actively trained to fail, as unlikely as that sounds. Jihadist thinking seems to have moved on from cells producing "spectaculars" to individual actions, where even if they fail they're still frightening people and showing that this is a war without apparent end, with the only option being to get the troops home. Conversely, it also means the authorities can keep on intensifying security whilst continuing to justify the lunacy of the war in Afghanistan. Everyone wins, except us.

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Tuesday, November 02, 2010 

Looking for answers which are almost certainly not there.

Our practice of not allowing photography in court does not always do justice to either the accused or those in the public gallery. The sketch of Roshonara Choudhry sitting in the dock during her trial for the attempted murder of the MP Stephen Timms is one of those occasions where the drawing seems to say everything yet also nothing about how she came to commit the crime. Sitting, seemingly unmoved by the machinations of a court which she doesn't recognise, she looks aloof, yet intense, her expression harsh and severe whilst also strangely unmoved. She looks for all the world exactly like someone capable of an act of icy political calculation. She doesn't however look like the one thing she most definitely is: a 21-year-old woman who has committed what on the surface seems to be a completely unexplainable and out of character act of violence. It isn't that it seems necessarily like something someone older would have done; if anything, her youth most likely contributed to her belief that she could achieve something by stabbing an MP who had voted for the Iraq war. It's more that the drawing almost seems to capture what you think her own mental image of herself probably is.

Why she decided to attempt to kill her MP, according to her own justification to the police as an act of vengeance for his vote for the Iraq war, is still very far from clear cut. We're told she isn't mentally ill, and wasn't at the time, whilst also being informed, both by "those close to" her as well as the police that she became radicalised as a result of watching the sermons of Anwar al-Awlaki, the currently much sought after supposed "spiritual leader" of al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula. This explanation for her act has it that she was an avenging angel inspired by the specific advice of al-Awlaki and his group, which is to do something, do anything and to act alone. She does indeed seemed to have abided somewhat by the strictures suggested in AQAP's recent propaganda journal Inspire, which was very much a guide to a personal jihad in isolation. She had no links to known extremists, or to any such groups, and doesn't seem to have accessed the usual sources of jihadi material online, apparently watching al-Awlaki's video messages on YouTube.

How much of this is coincidence and how much is genuine heeded advice is impossible to tell. Certainly, self-radicalisation is not unheard of, yet most who find themselves in such a position tend to look for others for reassurance that they're not alone, and if they can't find this within their circle of friends or acquaintances, they tend to look for it online. There is nothing to suggest that Choudhry did this. The only real previous example in this country of someone ostensibly motivated by radical Islamist ideology to commit acts of violence who acted alone was Nicky Reilly, the young convert with Asperger's syndrome who singularly failed to hurt anyone other than himself, and he was, according to the police, preyed upon, although it was never established by whom. Self-radicalisation which doesn't lead to joining up with like-minded others, where companionship and the reliance on each other helps enormously with the level of conviction which is generally need to take action can be a dead end; equally, it can be the authorities' worst nightmare, someone completely unknown to them entirely self-motivated and taught, and incredibly dangerous as a result. At the same time, the internet is not the most reliable of sources, and their actions as a result, especially if they involve the use of explosives, could be as laughable as Reilly's were.

It is however very difficult to believe that al-Awlaki was the prime motivating factor here. Especially interesting and perhaps instructive is Choudhry's obvious loathing for the British state as she saw it. Very few convicted jihadists for instance have completely disdained the court system and refused to cooperate with it, although some will again claim that this is motivated through maintaining innocence in order to extract the maximum amount of cost from the proceedings. This doesn't seem to be something that would have simply developed overnight. We don't know how Choudhry at the time reacted to the Iraq war, when she would have been 14, yet it seems reasonable to assume that it at the very least exercised her. Dismissing completely that the attack had its genesis then would be dubious to say the least.

Regardless of all of this, attaching any sort of blame to al-Awlaki, jihadist ideology or designating the attempted murder as an act of terrorism is nonsense. This was and remains first and foremost a criminal act, even if there was as it seems a premeditated motive which intrigues as much as it baffles. Dave Osler suggests that Choudhry's underlying motivation was just as visceral, rage-fuelled and political as that of the hunger strikers in the Maze prison and the anarchists of the Angry Brigade and it's difficult to demur. The key difference is that Choudhry wasn't trying to change anything; she wasn't and isn't demanding an end to the occupation of anywhere, or even martyring herself for a cause. She had no intention of killing herself, and left no finger-pointing video, delivering a more expansive reasoning behind her action. In an age when we seek meaning so desperately, and when so many have their own vision for what the world should look like and are keen to share it with everyone else, Choudhry seems determined to remain anonymous, for her simple act of violence to speak for itself, almost as a warning for others as to what could happen to them. It's no wonder then that we seek enlightenment from a simple drawing of her, looking for answers which are almost certainly not there.

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Tuesday, October 12, 2010 

"The ultimate mowing machine."

The second issue of the Inspire jihadi glossy - the one which caused an inordinate fuss among the more ignorant sections of the press previously - is out and contains some "original" thinking when it comes to launching attacks on a budget and without using explosives:

There are suggestions for low-cost operations in the US soil, such as shooting sprees in restaurants catering for government workers (such as in Washington DC), and using trucks to mow down pedestrians on crowded streets. The latter tactic can be further refined, Khan suggests, by welding sharp blades to the front of the truck so as to create “the ultimate mowing machine.”

Whether this is inspired by Carmageddon, Death Race 2000 or even the more recent delights of careering down pavements in Grand Theft Auto is impossible to tell. It does however certainly add colour to the "trust no one" ethos of the following advice:

  • Do not travel abroad for jihad – act on US soil instead.
  • Do not use mobile phones and the Internet for any jihad-related communication – if you have to, use coded language and encryption tools.
  • If you are clean stay clean – do not interact with other activists.
  • Do not access jihadi websites – get your jihadi propaganda fix from anti-jihadi monitoring sites such as MEMRI and SITE.

With the exception of the suggestion to act on US soil, this could have been written by a spook just as much as a jihadi. While anyone taking this advice would be incredibly difficult to track or monitor, it would also greatly isolate them - and almost no one acting completely alone has ever launched a successful attack. Those that have have almost always been in contact with someone else or even a whole group and received encouragement from them, or acted in the hope that their deeds will inspire others. A more disturbing parallel worth drawing, and alluded to in the first suggestion above, is with spree-killers, who on many occasions have acted completely alone, yet have been somewhat inspired to do so by those who have gone before them, to such an extent that some term them as copycat crimes. With some also now suggesting that America might have just as much of a problem with radical Islam among its own citizens as it's long been claimed we have, the Fort Hood shooting provides a model which is far more achievable, and with it frightening than any cartoonish video game influenced plan.

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Wednesday, January 20, 2010 

The illusion of safety.

Amid all the predictable over-reaction to Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab's successful attempt to set fire to himself, the first thing to go out the window was any sort of perspective. We are now after all fast approaching the fifth anniversary of the 7/7 attacks, which also marks the last successful attack by takfirist jihadists on a Western city. Not that al-Qaida and its franchises haven't tried to attack or haven't been plotting; it's just that all their attempts have either been spectacular failures or have been successfully prevented.

While America supposedly worries that this otherwise inconsequential island has the highest number of al-Qaida operatives in the West, they don't seem to have noted how, even if accurate, just how incompetent they are. First we had the 21/7 group, whose chapati flour bombs sadly failed to rise (surely explode? Ed), the liquid doom plotters, who needed to be tried twice before a jury was convinced that the main three were going to target aircraft, and where it has never been successfully proved that they were ever going to be capable of constructing a viable explosive, even if they had the necessary material, and then, and most humorously, we found ourselves threatened by two geniuses who thought that they could make a bomb by simply filling a car with patio gas canisters without realising that they needed either a detonator or an oxidiser to create an explosion that was going to actually hurt anyone. Instead, they, like Abdulmutalab succeeded in only harming themselves rather than anyone else.

No, instead we have politicians to do the harming for us. Admittedly, the "underpants" bomber's attempted attack was more serious than the Glasgow airport duo's failure, both for the reason that it focused attention on the deteriorating situation in Yemen, but also because he used proper military explosives, even if they also failed to detonate. It is though unclear whether even if he had created a successful detonation he would have managed to bring the plane down; he may well have killed both himself and some of those seated around him, but the plane could well have limped home, close as it was to its destination. The key fact is though that he failed, and that once such a method has been attempted, it's unlikely to be repeated. Not even the morons "who love death more than we love life" tend to repeat themselves once they've failed once; instead they somewhat innovate. Project Bojinka became the liquid bomb plot, similar but involving suicide bombers and with a different more obtainable explosive. Richard Reid's attempt led to Abdulmutalab's, and in turn will likely lead to a further attempt along the lines of the failed assassination of the Saudi prince Muhammad bin Nayef by Abdullah Hassan Al Aseery, in which the explosive might well have been inside his anal canal, although some have since suggested it was sewn into his underpants ala Abdulmutalab.

Is there any point then whatsoever to today's "package of enhanced security measures"? It seems doubtful, especially the ludicrous stopping of direct flights between Britain and Yemen, as if that'll somehow stop anyone travelling between the two countries instead of just inconveniencing them somewhat. It's also unclear just what use a "no-fly" list will be when almost all those who have attempted attacks in this country have either been British citizens, been here since childhood or here legitimately, such as the Glasgow attackers. As for the full-body scanners, Abdulmutalab went through rigorous security in both Nigeria and the Netherlands which failed to detect his explosives; as it simply isn't possible to go over everyone with a fine tooth comb there's still no guarantee that a bomber wouldn't get on a flight in similar circumstances. The only part of the proposals that might help is the further sharing of intelligence and the security services joint investigation team to be set-up.

In short, this is the same old illusion of safety that we've always had. If the intention is to do something rather than doing nothing, then the government has succeeded. If instead the intention was to increase the fear factor, then it might work amongst a few people; more likely though is that it will just further infuriate those who regularly travel. If al-Qaida in Yemen's real motive was to further discourage air travel they might have succeeded, although then again, the government seems as determined to do the job just as well for them.

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Friday, September 11, 2009 

Al-Qaida is dead. Long live al-Qaida.

Al-Qaida faces recruitment crisis, claims the Graun.  One has to wonder if this isn't just to do with all the associated problems currently facing them in Pakistan, with the army apparently ready or getting ready to move into Waziristan, but rather because Ayman al-Zawahiri is an increasingly derided figure within jihadi circles while bin Laden may as well be dead, even if he isn't, such is his current input.

As well as that to contend with, it's the simple truth that al-Qaida in Pakistan is on the back foot.  Young idealistic fighters aren't attracted to lost causes, hence why Iraq has also now dropped down the list of places that most wished to travel and fight in.  Afghanistan suddenly looks attractive again, while probably the biggest success now is al-Shabaab in Somalia, a triumph for which American interference, in the form of the Ethiopian invasion to overthrow the Islamic Courts Union in Mogadishu a couple of years back can be squarely linked to.  Al-Qaida in the Islamic Mahgreb, formerly the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat is also apparently proposing.  The key here also is that these are nationalist struggles, not global ones.  They might fight with the intention one day of going global, but nationalism rather than globalism can still motivate the locals far more than the utopian idealism of a global caliphate can.

Finally, there's also the fact that this could, despite so much academic concern, just be a fad, somewhat like the left-wing terrorism of the 70s and 80s in Europe was.  There's also the fact that 9/11 is now to those who were only say, 10 at the time and are now entering adulthood, almost ancient history.  Bin Laden?  Who's he?  There will be others, surely, to take his place, like Abu Musab al-Zarqawi already has to an extent in jihadist idealism, but bin Laden himself is not getting any younger.  New heroes emerge as the old ones decay.  The real thing to fear might well be the next generation of Islamic extremists, just as deadly in their ambition as Zarqawi, and with even less qualms about things like shedding blood, definitely including that of fellow Muslims.  The old al-Qaida might be withering away, but a new one or a successor will surely take its place.

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Thursday, November 22, 2007 

Militants, terrorists, Islamofascists, or takfirists?

Timothy Garton Ash writes another well argued and important article, this time on what we should call those inspired by the ideology behind al-Qaida, and comes I think to mostly the right conclusion.

First, Islamofascist is mostly a laughable term. The main argument for its use tends to be that many moons ago, some Islamists had a grudging respect for the Nazis or were even in some cases inspired by them, as Maududi was. Slightly more persuasive is that the idea of a worldwide Islamic caliphate, especially if it is to be imposed by force, with Sharia law forming the legal system in such a state, as laughable and implausible as the concept is, more than bears resemblance to Lebensraum, a key component of Nazi ideology.

While Ash outlines a number of other reasons why the term doesn't ring true, I think he leaves an important one out. The main use of "Islamofascist", is directly or not, to infer that the threat we now face from al-Qaida is somehow comparable to that which manifested itself in the 1930s. This fantasy isn't just confined to the neo-cons who most liberally use the term: Sir Ian Blair has claimed something highly similar, and while Jonathan Evans wasn't entirely clear, he also said that the current threat level was the highest in MI5's existence. Most crucially, "the enemy", whoever it is has been since 1945, except in the case of the Soviet Union, has always been compared and made out to be the new Hitler. Go through them all, whether it be Gaddafi, the Ayatollahs, Saddam Hussein and numerous others, all have been the Nazis reincarnate. Mostly it's just laziness, but it's also borne out of a desire to scaremonger and resort to propaganda, looking for a false equivalence which motivates support for action.

Islamists is mostly covered by Ash, who rightly says that to use Islamists when referring to those who murder either 572 Yazidis or 52 commuters is to link those who do so with the likes of the Hizb-ut-Tahrir, the Muslim Brotherhood, or indeed, even the Justice and Development party in Turkey. We might not agree with their politics, and while some who were formerly members of the first two have become terrorists, they're still in no way comparable to the violence advocated and justified by the ideology behind al-Qaida.

Ash then prefers "jihadists", or especially "jihadist extremists" and "jihadist terrorists" and I think he's mostly right. Even there though there are slight problems. You could describe the likes of Hamas as jihadists, and while they're certainly terrorists or have been terrorists, considering they haven't launched a suicide bombing inside Israel now for a number of years, there's again a distinct difference between the aims of Hamas and the aims of al-Qaida. Similarly, there are jihadist groups in Iraq like the Islamic Army of Iraq (now widely believed to have turned almost completely on the Islamic State of Iraq), the 1920 Revolution Brigades and numerous others that are jihadist in ideology, but are completely opposed to attacks on civilians and have never used the tactic of suicide bombings. Regular readers might have noticed that I'm partial to the use of takfirist, at least in one definition of the word, that those who adhere to the ideology behind al-Qaida don't care who they kill, and exemplified by how the Islamic State of Iraq has murdered thousands of Shias through the specific targeting of Shia dominated areas in Iraq by suicide bombers. If such attacks even kill Sunnis, that's unfortunate, but that can still be justified by the belief that like the bomber they will be martyrs to the cause. The most accurate way to my mind to describe them then is "jihadist takfiris" or "takfiri jihadis", whichever you prefer, although jihadists is more than acceptable shorthand.

Ash ends the article with a flourish:

There is an obligation on those of us who are non-Muslims living in open societies like Britain, to choose our words carefully. Until someone comes up with a better one, I think "jihadists" is the most appropriate shorthand. There is, however, an equal and matching obligation on our Muslim opinion leaders. That is to condemn, audibly and unambiguously, the jihadists who threaten us all.

Indeed.

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